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MR. JUSTICE HARLAN:
DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
WiMLTA H. LEDBETR, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Due process of law," originally equated with the term "law
of the land" and apparently intended as a purely procedural
safeguard, became a significant part of the American constitu-
tional system when the phrase was inserted in the fifth amend-
ment. But as a guaranty of procedural fairness, as well as a
substantive requirement of reasonableness in legislation, the due
process concept received relatively little attention until after the
Civil War when it was applied to the states in the fourteenth
amendment.'
Some issues which would be relevant to a consideration of the
difficulties generated by the phrase, especially with reference
to its restrictions upon the use of state police powers, had been
settled by the time the fourteenth amendment was ratified: (1)
The Bill of Rights was more than a half century old, explicitly
protecting the people against unwarranted intrusion by the
national government 2 and echoing a recognition of certain fan-
damental values essential to a society such as Americans were
trying to build. (2) The doctrine of judicial review had been
established, and it was clear that to the judiciary, and more
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
B.A., Campbell College; graduate study, Duke University; LL.B., University
of Richmond; LL.M., Yale University. Member of Virginia Bar and Ameri-
can Bar Association.
1. From the outset of our constitutional history due process of law as it
occurs in the Fifth Amendment had been recognized as a restraint upon
government, but, with one conspicuous exception, only in the narrower
sense that a legislature must provide "due process for the enforcement
of the law;" and it was in accordance with this limited appraisal of the
clause that the Court disposed of early cases arising thereunder.
N. SMALL & L. JAYSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AmEnicA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1082 (1964).
2. Before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment the Bill of Rights was
held to limit the federal government, but not the states. Barron v. Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) established the doc-
trine of judicial review in this country; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87 (1810) is the first clear precedent for the proposition that the Supreme
Court is empowered to hold state laws unconstitutional. Two other cases,
decided in 1816 and 1821, precluded further serious doubts about the Court's
authority over the states. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816); Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821). See R. Mc-
CLOSKEY, TnE AmRCAN SUPREME COURT 48-53 & 59-65 (1960).
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particularly, to the Supreme Court, would fall the responsibility
of breathing life into the vague notions of due process. (3)
Although the various states had retained great power to order
society within their boundaries, it was becoming evident that the
complexities of industrialization and mobilization would shift
more responsibility to the central authority.
So it is against this backdrop that the High Court has been
called upon, as anticipated, to give meaning to the amorphous
concept. The perplexities of a fledgling free-enterprise system
and the rights of the workingman within this framework dom-
inated the Court's fourteenth amendment activities during the
latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
century.4 But over the past several decades, the Court has
strived to consolidate the nation's gains by turning its attention
to a most crucial problem-the relationship between the indi-
vidual and government. This has required response to two
interrelated questions: (1) How do we retain the philosophical
tenets of individual autonomy and freedom in a modern society?
(2) Iow do we maintain our historical commitment to federal-
ism and at the same time assure nationwide application of these
philosophical tenets?
Because of the traditional notion implicit in the concept of
federalism that the state shall play a large and important role
in ordering the lives of its citizens, the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment has risen to new heights of significance
and controversy during the fifties and sixties when the struggle
for civil liberties demanded the attention of the Court. In the
finest tradition of Anglo-American jurisprudence, the interpre-
tation and application of the notions embedded in the clause has
been a never-ending task.
John Marshall Harlan came to the Supreme Court at a time
when the Court's involvement in civil liberties was in full bloom,
and the due process clause was becoming a household phrase.
The Court was beginning to tackle some of the most difficult
socio-legal problems in the nation's history, such as speech, press,
religion, racial discrimination, and administration of criminal
justice. How Justice Harlan has responded to these contem-
porary problems, and how he has seen fit to impose the judg-
4. R. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERCAN SuPREmE COURT 101-79 (1960). This
is not to say, of course, that other issues did not arise. See, e.g., Strauder v.
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ments of the federal judiciary on the states is the subject of this
article. Such a project involves delving into the philosophies
of Cardozo and Frankfurter, civil libertarianism and federalism,
separation of power and judicial restraint.
Justice Harlan is the grandson of a fiery nineteenth-century
liberal who is remembered for his dissent from the Court's
approbatory stance on the "separate-but-equal" doctrine in
Plesy v. Ferguson..5 Born in Chicago, the present Justice
Harlan was educated at Princeton and New York Law School,
and as a Rhodes Scholar, at Oxford. A Dewey Republican, he
practiced law on Wall Street within the upper-crust circles,
served admirably on several state commissions, and sat briefly
on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit before being
appointed by President Eisenhower to succeed Mr. Justice
Jackson. At the congressional hearings in 1955, the nominee
gained the confidence of the politicians as he handled himself
discretely against a series of attacks by superpatriots who ques-
tioned his concern for internationalism and the work of the
United Nations.
6
The New Yorker undoubtedly brought to the Court a respect
for the philosophies of two great legal scholars, Justice Benja-
min Cardozo and the then active Justice Felix Frankfurter. As
reflected in his opinions over the past thirteen years, he was
influenced in his thinking on due process problems by his com-
panion of seven years, Frankfurter, who in turn had been greatly
influenced by Holmes and Brandeis.
7
II. TuE PRECEPTS OF CARDOzo AND FRANE nmTEm
Justice Cardozo came to the Court in the early thirties, after a
dozen years on the New York Court of Appeals, to replace
Justice Brandeis. Under his leadership the New York court was
among the finest in the country's history. His astuteness and
convincing style of writing were reflected in such decisions as
Pa~sgraf v. Long IsZand Railroad8 and MacPherson v. Buick
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
6. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 129 et seq. (1955).
7. RoDaM4, Nin MEvN 269-273 (1955).
8. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
1968]
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Motor, Go.,9 and his genius was manifest in a series of lectures
delivered at the Yale Law School.10
His concern for social justice in an age of expanding business
and big government was apparent in his decisions, ,but he was
constantly aware of the dangers of judicial activism. As Frank-
furter was later to exclaim: "We do not sit like a kadi under a
tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual
expediency."" And as Cardozo noted in a classic statement in
1921:
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He
is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant,
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated
principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a dis-
cretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, dis-
ciplined by system, and subordinated to "the primordial
necessity of order in the social life." Wide enough in all con-
science is the field of discretion that remains.12
His attitude toward due process is best summarized in Palko v.
Gonneotiout,'8 in which the defendant contended that the state's
appeal from a verdict of not guilty and subsequent re-trial
amounted to double jeopardy as prohibited by the fifth amend-
ment in federal cases and allegedly by the fourteenth amendment
in state cases. Rejecting the "incorporation theory," Cardozo
instead pursued the "absorption theory :"14
We reach a different plane of social and moral values when
we pass to the privileges and immunities that have been taken
over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and
brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of
9. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
10. B. CAnnozo, THE NATURE oF Trn JUDIcIAL PRocEss (1921) ; B. CAnozo,
THE GRoVTH OF THE LAW (1924).
11. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 8 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
12. B. CAtmozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDiCAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
13. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
14. The difference between incorporation and absorption is not merely a
technical one, but one which involves basic problems of constitutional theory.
Frankfurter makes the distinction in Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorpora-
tion" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 746 (1965). Justice Black recognizes the dis-
tinction on many occasions, such as in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
[Vol. 20
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absorption.... If the Fourteenth Amendment has ab-
sorbed them, the process of absorption has had its source in
the belief that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.15
It was in PaZko that Cardozo defined due process as a guaranty
of those immunities, privileges, and fundamental freedoms pro-
tected from infringement by the states because they had been
found "to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ... .16
Successor to the "scholar's seat," Frankfurter was of national
prominence prior to his 1939 appointment, having been a profes-
sor at Harvard Law School since 1914 along with the likes of
Pound, Williston, Seavy, Scott and Chafee. He was an authority
on the federal court system, as well as constitutional law. He
was intimate with both Holmes and Brandeis, whose concepts of
civil liberties he tempered with judicial restraint and applied to
a new era.
Frankfurter cannot be accused of treating the Constitution as
a listing of immutable dogmas on parchment. He recognized the
Constitution as "not a fixed body of truth but a mode of social
adjustment," 17 and called upon the Court to respond "to the
potentialities of the Constitution to meet the needs of our
society."' 8 His faith in the democratic system and in human
dignity was well known.19 But in an age of judicial activism he
refused to permit his own notions of individual rights and the
imprudence of state legislation to shape the contours of due
process.
In a case made famous by Justice Black's dissent, in which
he accepted the "incorporation theory" and was joined by three
other justices, Frankfurter wrote one of his many separate con-
curring opinions which depicted his ideas concerning due process:
Those reading the English language with the meaning
which it ordinarily conveys, those conversant with the politi-
cal and legal history of the concept of due process, those
sensitive to the relations of the States to the central govern-
ment as well as the relation of some of the provisions of the
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
16. Id. at 325.
17. F. Fp NPuRm-, LAw AxD Porxncs 48 (1962).
18. Id. at 58.
19. F. FRAxxFuRaT, Tun PUBLIC AND iTs Gow==ME (1930).
1968]
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Bill of Rights to the process of justice, would hardly recog-
nize the Fourteenth Amendment as a cover for the various
explicit provisions of the first eight amendments.2 0
The relevant question is whether the criminal proceedings
which resulted in conviction deprived the accused of the due
process of law to which the United States Constitution entit-
led him. Judicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth
Amendment inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise
of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings in
order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous offense. These standards of justice are not
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were
prescriptions in a pharmacopoeia. . . . The judicial judg-
ment in applying the Due Process Clause must move within
the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not based upon
the idiosyncracies of a merely personal judgment.
2
1
The case involved the criminal procedure of California, but
the ideas expressed, with slight alterations of phraseology, could
have been directed at any piece of state legislation purportedly
violating the due process clause.
Another example of Frankfurter's treatment of due process is
found in the 1943 "Flag Salute Case," 22 which overruled a pre-
vious decision 23 and decided that school children could not be
required to salute the national flag if it offended their religious
beliefs. In a dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, by origin an Aus-
trian Jew, wrote some of the most poignant phrases to be found
in judicial utterances:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted
minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the free-
doms guaranteed by our Constitution. Were my purely
personal attitude relevant I should whole-heartedly associate
myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's
20. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (concurring opinion).
21. Id. at 67-68.
22. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943)
(dissenting opinion).
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opinion. ... As a member of this Court I am not justified
in writing my personal notions of policy into the Constitu-
tion.... I cannot bring my mind to believe that the
"liberty" secured by the Due Process Clause gives this
Court authority to deny to the State of West Virginia the
attainment of that which we all recognize as a legitimate
legislative end, namely, the promotion of good citizenship
by employment of the means here chosen. 24
In a speech case involving group libel, Frankfurter was again
willing to permit the state legislature to make rational judgments
for the good of the public order by prohibiting publications por-
traying the depravity or lack of virtue of a class of citizens.
Punishment for uttering libelous statements, he concluded, was
not a denial of due process. 25 As expected, he refused even to
refer to the first amendment, causing three justices, Reed,
Douglas and Black, to reiterate the "incorporation theory" in one
form or another.
This brief excursion through scattered remarks of these two
jurists is thought to have been necessary as a background for
investigating Justice Harlan's ideas on the meaning of due pro-
cess and that concept's applicability to civil liberty and to state
restrictions which allegedly infringe upon such liberty. It is
evident, as noted below, that he has accepted many of the prin-
ciples expounded by his two predecessors and has coordinated
them with his own notions of jurisprudence and the role of the
judiciary in the American constitutional scheme of things.
III. THE DuE PROCESS CLAUSE AND STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The adoption of the fourteenth amendment marked the real
beginning of federal activity in the area of state administration
of criminal justice. But during the half century following ratifi-
cation there was an absence of decisions in those areas which are
of critical importance today. It was not until 1915 that the Court
was presented with the problem of mob domination of a trial;
not until 1932 that the right to counsel was raised; not until 1935
that the effect of perjured testimony was considered; and not
24. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-47
(1943) (dissenting opinion).
25. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
19681
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until 1936 that the admissibility of a coerced (i.e., involuntary)
confession was before the Court.20
In the late fifties and early sixties, however, the Court began
to tangle with these difficulties head-on, a process which neces-
sarily involved the due process clause and demanded the attention
of the Associate Justice from New York.
The recent opinions of Justice Harlan in this area of constitu-
tional law reflect perhaps more than any others his philosophy
of due process and his attitudes about that clause and its relation-
ship to civil liberties. Thus, much attention is herein given to
the writings on this subject.
In 1963, Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court in a
decision which overruled a twenty-year-old decision and held that
the right to counsel guaranteed in the sixth amendment is a
"fundamental safeguard of liberty" and thus protected against
state invasion by the due process clause of the fourteenth. This
"fundamental right essential to a fair trial" was held to apply
not only to those who could afford to hire attorneys, but to obli-
gate the state to provide counsel at the trial of an indigent.
Justice Harlan concurred, agreeing that the right to counsel
was a fundamental right guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment, despite the fact that the Court was overruling a decision
in which Justice Frankfurter had concurred in 1942. Whether
Justice Frankfurter would have changed his mind about the
issue if he had been on the bench in 1963 is doubtful, but such
conjecture is immaterial: although accepting the great Justice's
attitudes about the meaning of due process and the desirability of
deferring to state practices, Justice Harlan is noted for his indi-
vidualism and lack of undue dedication to any particular wing
of the Court, and so he arrived at his own conclusions. But while
agreeing with the results reached by the majority, Justice Harlan
found it necessary to add the following remarks to emphasize the
rationale of his position:
When we hold a right or immunity, valid against the Federal
Government, to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
and thus valid against the States, I do not read our past
decisions to suggest that by so holding we automatically
carry over an entire body of federal law and apply it in full
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sweep to the States. Any such concept would disregard the
frequently wide disparity between the legitimate interests of
the States and of the Federal Government, the divergent
problems that they face, and the significantly different con-
sequences of their actions.
27
Since the noted "incorporationist", Justice Black, was han-
dling the majority opinion, Justice Harlan made some graceful
parting remarks:
In what is done today I do not understand the Court to
depart from the principles laid down in Palko . . . or to
embrace the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment "incor-
porates" the Sixth Amendment as such.
28
Although Justice Harlan could strike a blow for civil liberties
and basic fairness compatible with his philosophy of the due
process clause and his attitude about the role of the judiciary in
state actions in this instance, he found himself at odds with the
majority when the Court applied federal standards to such proce-
dural questions as search and seizure, incriminating statements
and confessions.
Two years prior to the right-to-counsel landmark, the Court
decided that the safeguard against unreasonable search and
seizure of the fourth amendment carried with it to the states the
application of the "exclusionary rule" first expounded for the
federal system in Weeks v. United State. 29 This ruling required
the fall of WoZf v. Colorado,30 a 1949 case in which Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, had reached the opposite
conclusion. Justice Harlan accepted the thesis that unreasonable
searches and seizures invaded the right to privacy and was an
unconstitutional intrusion violative of due process, but he could
not agree that this conclusion should impose the exclusionary
rule upon the states. In a dissenting opinion joined by the soon-
to-retire Frankfurter, Justice Harlan made the following perti-
nent observations:
This reasoning [of the majority] ultimately rests on the un-
sound premise that because Wolf carried into the States, as
27. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (concurring opinion).
28. Id.
29. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
30. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
1968]
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part of "the concept of ordered liberty" embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment, the principle of "privacy" under-
lying the Fourth Amendment, it must follow that whatever
configurations of the Fourth Amendment have been de-
veloped in the particularizing federal precedents are like-
wise to be deemed a part of "ordered liberty," and as such
are enforceable against the States. For me, this does not
follow at all.
[W]hat the Court is now doing is to impose upon the
States not only the federal substantive standards of "search
and seizure" but also the basic federal remedy for violation
of those standards.31
Emphasizing the primacy of the doctrine of federalism, the
Associate Justice asserted:
An approach which regards the issue as one of achieving
procedural symmetry or of serving administrative conven-
ience surely disfigures the boundaries of the Court's func-
tions in relation to the state and federal courts. . . . Here
we review state procedures whose measure is to be taken
not against the specific substantive commands of the Fourth
Amendment but under the flexible contours of the Due
Process Clause. I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment empowers this Court to mould state remedies effectuat-
ing the right to freedom from "arbitrary intrusion by the
police" to suit its own notions of how things should be
done .... 32
I regret that I find so unwise in principle and so inexpe-
dient in policy a decision motivated by the high purpose of
increasing respect for Constitutional rights.33
It might be noted that Justice Cardozo rejected the Weeks
exclusionary rule for the State of New York while chief
justice of that bench, holding it inapplicable to the states
through the due process clause and not commendable as a pro-
cedural device because "[t]he criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered.1 34 Justice Clark, who was writing for
31. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678-80 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
32. Id. at 681-82.
33. Id. at 686.
34. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
[Vol. 20
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/1
DuE PROCESS AND Civx LiBmTmS
the majority, and Justice Harlan commented unfavorably and
favorably, respectively, on that decision.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court in 1964 reversed several previous
rulings and held that the privilege against self-incrimination is
protected by the fourteenth amendment against abridgement by
the states, and that such a privilege carries with it the federal
standards. Justice Harlan wrote a strong dissent, reiterating
his ideas concerning due process by quoting Justice Cardozo's
classic expression in Palko (set forth above) and adding:
It is apparent that Mr. Justice Cardozo's metaphor of
"absorption" was not intended to suggest the transplanta-
tion of case law surrounding the specifics of the first eight
Amendments to the very different soil of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. For, as he made perfect-
ly plain, what the Fourteenth Amendment requires of the
States does not basically depend on what the first eight
Amendments require of the Federal Government."
In a tone more emphatic than his statements on the subject in
Mapp, he laid out his thoughts on federalism and his fears for
its destruction:
About all that the Court offers in explanation of this ["same
standard"] conclusion is the observation that it would be
"incongruous" if the different standards governed the as-
sertion of a privilege to remain silent in state and federal
tribunals. Such "incongruity," however, is at the heart of
our federal system ...
... If the power of the States to deal with local crime is
unduly restricted, the likely consequence is a shift of re-
sponsibility in this area to the Federal Government, with its
vastly greater resources. Such a shift, if it occurs, may in
the end serve to weaken the very liberties which the Four-
teenth Amendment safeguards by bringing us closer to the
monolithic society which our federalism rejects.86
By 1964 the Court was unwilling, and perhaps unable, to draw
back from constant involvement in the criminal law administra-
tion of the states. Thus it embarked upon an adventure into
the police interrogation rooms which has not yet been concluded.
35. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 24 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
36. Id. at 27 & 28.
19681
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That year, in Escobedo v. Illinos37 the Court held (again, 5-4)
that when police investigation turns from general inquiry to
accusation, certain warnings and right to counsel are necessary
before any statement elicited by the law enforcement officials
can be used against the accused at a criminal trial. Justice
Harlan dissented. In 1966, the requisite warnings were clarified
and the right to counsel was extended to indigents in the police
station as Chief Justice Warren authored a police manual for
the states. Miranda v. Arizona S8 was another 5-4 squeaker, and
Justice Harlan penned a rather lengthy dissent. He underlined
his disapproval of the decision in the concluding paragraph:
Nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in
the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided
action that is so precipitously taken by the Court in the
name of fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities. The
foray which the Court makes today brings to mind the wise
and farsighted words of Mr. Justice Jackson: . . . "This
Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of con-
stitutional law and the temples have a way of collapsing
when one story too many is added." 9
IV. THE Dum Paocss CLAuS. AwD From SPcEcH
A convenient distinction is made between the types of speech
which if restricted can raise constitutional questions. Varying
fact-situations, policy considerations and degrees of gravity of
harm are involved. One type of speech is that which advocates
the violent overthrow of the government; another is that which
advocates unlawful and socially unacceptable conduct; a third
category is that speech which does not advocate but incites
violence; another type of speech involves defamatory statements
impugning the character of another person; finally, there is
obscenity. Restrictions and regulations that infringe the free-
dom of expression have necessarily involved state legislation
and, therefore, the due process clause. This is another area of
constitutional law with which the Court has been concerned
recently, and, again, Justice Harlan's attitudes about the clause
and its relationship to civil liberties are reflected in the decisions.
37. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. Id. at 525-26.
[Vol. 20
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State and local loyalty oaths have posed problems for the
Court, one of the more notable cases being Elfbrandt v. RusseZl40
in which the Court in a 54 decision struck down an Arizona
oath. Justice Harlan was one of the dissenters but did not write
a separate opinion. He also dissented when the Court invali-
dated a Washington loyalty program in 1964.41 It is apparent
that he does not think that due process prohibits the states from
conditioning public employment upon abstention from knowing
membership in organizations advocating the violent overthrow
of the government that employs them or from seeking to elicit
information about or from prospective employees. In this he
agrees with Justice Frankfurter. 42
But in other instances involving freedom of expression and
association, in which there was obviously no reasonable basis for
the state's action, Justice Harlan has refused to allow these free-
doms to be trampled. When Alabama tried to stifle the NAACP
by requiring it to reveal its membership lists, he wrote the
Court's opinion striking down such efforts.43 Six years later
Alabama was still meddling in the affairs of that organization
on the premise that it was attempting only to regulate a foreign
corporation, and Justice Harlan again wrote the Court's decision
upholding the rights of the NAACP to refuse access to its mem-
bership lists. 44 Citing prior case law, the jurist made it clear
that "[ilt is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect
of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." 45 Un-
willing to push this point so far as to prohibit a state from im-
posing regulations as to the manner of legal representation with-
in its borders, he was forced to dissent in NAACP v. Button.46
This distinction illustrates that Justice Harlan is not an "absolu-
tist" on the issue of speech, and thinks that the due process clause
40. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
41. Baggett v. Bulltt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
42. See Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Garner v. Board of Pub. Works,
341 U.S. 716, 724 (1951).
43. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
44. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
45. Id. at 307, quoting from NAACP v. Alabama ex reL. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
46. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
1968]
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leaves room for flexible standards and value judgments in each
particular instance.
47
New York Times v. SuZlivanA moved the Court into another
category of expression-defamation. Justice Harlan was with
the other eight Justices in denying recovery for damages, agree-
ing with the view expressed by Justice Brennan that no action
can be brought by a public official for a defamatory falsehood
against his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with "actual malice" (i.e., with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not).
(Black, Douglas and Goldberg concurred in the result but were
of the opinion that first amendment freedoms are absolute.)
This type of decision, which allows dissemination of information
about the activities of public officials, is in accord with the
Brandeis "political truth" theory, which considered discussion
and debate on varying views, particularly on matters of such
consequence as government activities, to be of the essence of
democracy and enlightened republicanism. Brandeis, as noted
above, is a former Justice whose reasoning is held in high regard
by Justice Harlan. This is probably why Justice Harlan
warned the Court two years later49 not to deviate from this
rationale and abolish the common law tort of defamation alto-
gether. Surely he felt that such an extension of Sulivan would
be a result of specious reasoning, and was not called for by the
due process clause when freedom of expression is grounded upon
the theories of Brandeis.
It is on the issue of obscenity that the Court has been riding
rough seas lately, and an examination of the opinions of Justice
Harlan are illuminating.
It was in 1957 that the Court embarked upon this uncharter-
ed course, deciding in Roth v. United States50 that obscenity is
not within that area of constitutionally protected speech or
press, and that obscenity is defined for judicial purposes as
47. See, e.g., Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 63 (1947) and Cardozo's opinion for the Court in Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). These flexible standards and value judgments
require what Justice Black termed in his Adamson dissent the "natural law
theory" which, he contended, degrades "the constitutional safeguards of the
Bill of Rights and simultaneously [appropriates] for this Court a broad power
which we are not authorized by the Constitution to exercise." Adamson v.
California supra at 70.
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 96 (1966) (concurring opinion).
50. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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material which deals with sex in a manner appealing predom-
inately to prurient interest and is utterly without redeeming
social importance. Since this case involved a federal postal
statute, due process was not relevant to the determination of the
issue. But because the Court applied the same standards to a
companion state case, Justice Harlan wrote a separate opinion.51
He rephrased the question as it concerns federal restriction of
expression: "[W]hether the federal obscenity statute, as con-
strued and applied in this case, violates the First Amendment
to the Constitution." 2 He thought the Roth test was not suffi-
ciently restrictive--the dangers to free thought and expression
dre truly great if the Federal Government imposes a blanket
ban over the Nation on such a book" 53-and should permit the
central government to exclude from the mails only that literature
which can be described as "hard-core pornography." But he
insisted that the question as it pertains to state legislation should
be phrased differently: "[Whether the defendant was deprived
of liberty without due process of law when he was convicted for
selling certain materials found by the judge to be obscene .... "4
Why this distinction? Because state and federal powers in this
area are not the same. Why are they not the same? Because
first, the fourteenth amendment does not "incorporate" the blunt
and specific wording of the first amendment, and this is so be-
cause second, the national commitment to the idea of federalism
(sprinkled lightly with a dash of judicial restraint) precludes
the judiciary from constructing questionable historical or philo-
sophical rationalizations for requiring that all states conform to
the mandates intended originally to be directed at the federal
authorities.
This differentiation between state and federal powers which
Justice Harlan supports in this area of civil liberties is nowhere
better underscored than in the series of cases following Roth. In
Ginzburg v. United States,55 in which the Court upheld a con-
viction under a federal statute, he dissented, arguing that the
First Amendment is a tight restraint upon federal laws banning
51. Id. at 496 (concurring in Alberts v. California and dissenting in Roth
v. United States).
52. Id. at 503.
53. Id. at 506.
54. Id. at 500.
55. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
19681
15
Ledbetter: Mr. Justice Harlan: Due Process and Civil Liberties
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REviEwo
expression and can be constitutionally applied only to "hard-core
pornography." But in two state cases, handed down the same
day, he opted for deference to the legislatures, concurring when
the Court upheld a conviction and dissenting when the Court
struck down another."0 lie made his point in his dissent in the
Fanny Hill case:
[T]he Constitution does not bind the States and the Federal
Government in precisely the same fashion. This approach is
plainly consistent with the language of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments and, in my opinion, more responsive
to the proper functioning of a federal system of government
in this area. . . . [T]he decisions have never declared that
every utterance the Federal Government may not reach or
every regulatory scheme it may not enact is also beyond
the power of the State.
57
After agreeing that federal suppression of expression is con-
stitutionally limited, and that Fanny Hill is not such "hard-
core pornography" that it should be barred from the mails, he
emphasizes the difference between this stance and the role of the
state in this country:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment requires of a State only that
it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of
obscenity and that it reach results not wholly out of step
with current American standards. As to criteria, it should
be adequate if the court or jury considers such elements as
offensiveness, pruriency, social value, and the like. The
latitude which I believe the States deserve cautions against
any federally imposed formula listing the exclusive ingre-
dients of obscenity and fixing their proportions. 58
Since there is plenty of room for disagreement in this area
of constitutional law, 9 he explained, why not permit the states
to experiment within the limits of rationality as defined in his
opinion, for indeed experimentation "is the underlying genius
of our federal system."
56. A Book v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502 (1966).
57. A Book v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 456 (1965) (concurring opinion).
58. Id. at 458.
59. The disagreement will become apparent through a quick glance at the
different opinions in the cases and the reasoning used to support the opinions.
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V. THE DuE Pxocss CLAUSE AND OTHRn STATE
RES RioTioNs oN FRnnoxs
Justice Harlan has been with the majority on the recent free-
dom of religion cases, recognizing that for a state to try to estab-
lish a religion or deny the free exercise thereof would be a
deprivation of liberty without due process. 0° He agreed with
Justice Goldberg in School Distict v. Sckempp"1 when the
younger Justice pointed out in a concurring opinion that the
decisions of the Court did not foreclose the government's "cogni-
zance of the existence of religion." In the cases involving the
Sunday Blue Laws, 62 he was again with the Court when these
state statutes were upheld. He joined Justice Frankfurter's con-
curring opinion in which the latter concluded that Sunday has
become in part at least a secular institution and that Sunday
restrictions can reasonably be said to serve a "substantial non-
ecclesiastical purpose relevant to a well-ordered social life," so
that the legislative discretion should stand.
In Cox v. Louisiana68 the Court reversed convictions of three
criminal charges against a Negro minister who had led a civil
rights march in Baton Rouge. The case involved not only speech
but also a mixture of assembly, protest and association. The
decision was by a 5-4 margin, with such a staunch supporter of
free speech as Justice Black balking at some portions of the
Court's rulings. Justice Harlan dissented, finding no denial of
due process in the actions taken by the state against the crowd
of 2,000 demonstrators.
It is sometimes surmised, without a careful reading of the
opinions and the rationale involved, that because Justice Harlan
is frequently not on the "side" of the Court's "civil libertarians"
he is an anti-liberal, etc. This paper has presumably dispelled
such simplistic and misinformed notions, but if there is lingering
questions, Griswold V. Connectiut64 is interesting. In that case
the Court struck down Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute.
Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, holding the law unconsti-
tutional because of a series of penumbras and emanations from
60. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
61. 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (concurring opinion).
62. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
63. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
64. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the Bill of Rights which reflect a societal value of privacy and
freedom of association in the marital bedroom. Several other
Justices used other devices to find the law invalid. Justice Black
was caught in the web that he had spun in Adamson, and since
he could find no explicit reference to privacy in the Bill of
Rights that could be "incorporated" into the fourteenth, he
dissented. Justice Harlan agreed in the Court's reversal of the
conviction but, of course, not because of the ninth amendment
or any other of the first ten amendments.
[W]hat I find implicit in the Court's opinion is that the "in-
corporation" doctrine may be used to restrict the reach of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.65 For me this is
just as unacceptable constitutional doctrine as is the use of
the "incorporation" approach to impose upon the States all
the requirements of the Bill of Rights as found in the provi-
sions of the first eight amendments and in the decisions of
this Court interpreting them .... 66
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case
is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment
violates basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" . . . . I believe that it does. While the relevant
inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them
or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own
bottom.6
7
Summarizing his reasons for following this approach to state
civil liberties cases, Justice Harlan called for judicial self-
restraint, and said that this would be achieved "only by contin-
ual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and
wise appreciation of the great roles that the doctrine of federal-
ism and separation of powers have played in establishing and
preserving American freedoms." 68
65. This is what Justice Black did in his dissent.
66. This is what the Court had been doing in many cases, such as in the
field of criminal procedure.
67. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (concurring opinion).
68. Id. at 501.
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VI. CoNCLUsIoN
Should a man of less preception and articulateness have tried
to adopt the profound thinking of Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo
and Frankfurter, and applied them to contemporary problems,
the results may well have been ludicrous. This is not the case,
however, with Justice Harlan, whose scholarship, objectivity, dis-
passionate approach to key emotional issues, and earnest respect
for the constitutional scheme of government, have made him a
worthy successor to those Justices whose ideals he now represents
on the Court. That he is not a "judicial activist" at a point in
time when such an approach is fashionable should not diminish
his stature. His treatment of civil liberty cases within the due
process clause no doubt causes him in many instances to decide a
case quite differently from his personal tastes. But such is the
role of a judge. To paraphrase a statement which Justice Har-
lan himself made referring to another Justice: He brings to bear
on his judgments a deep understanding of the nature and values
of federalism, a scrupulous observance of the boundaries between
the various branches of government, and a sensitive regard for
the balance that must ever be achieved in a free society between
individual rights and governmental power.69
69. Harlan, The Frankfurter Imprint As Seen By a Colleague, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 2 (1962).
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